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STATE V. JONES: MARYLAND'S FLEXIBLE PRESENT SENSE
IMPRESSION EXCEPTION
In State v. Jones I the Court of Appeals ruled that testimony by a
state police officer as to contents of a conversation overheard on the
citizens band (CB) radio was admissible under the present sense ex-
ception to the hearsay rule.2 The court found that the transmissions
overheard by the witness police officer possessed the characteristics
of spontaneous observations of an event occurring contemporane-
ously with the transmissions.' It ruled that the evidence was suffi-
ciently reliable to be admitted,4 even though the identities of the
transmitters were unknown, the transmitters were not speaking di-
rectly to the state trooper, anid the officer could not personally cor-
roborate the observation. In so holding, the court reaffirmed its
intention to give broad scope to the present sense impression
exception.
I. THE CASE
Jeffrey Douglas Jones (Jones), a state police officer, was con-
victed in the Circuit Court for Harford County of a third degree
sexual offense, assault and battery, and two counts of misconduct in
the office of state trooper.5 The incident in question originated with
a late night traffic stop on Interstate 95 (1-95). Jones stopped a mo-
torist because he was unable to determine whether her vehicle dis-
played a rear license plate due to a short circuit in the vehicle's rear
tag light. What happened thereafter was "sharply in dispute" at
trial. 6
The woman claimed that she complied with the trooper's in-
struction to enter the police car while her male friend remained in
the car she had been driving.7 The woman further claimed that af-
ter Jones said he would have to search her, he handcuffed and pro-
ceeded to assault her.8 She said that when she protested, the
1. 311 Md. 23, 532 A.2d 169 (1987).
2. Id. at 35, 532 A.2d at 175.
3. Id. at 30, 532 A.2d at 172.
4. Id. at 32, 532 A.2d at 173.
5. Id. at 27, 532 A.2d at 171. Jones received a sentence of 2 years in jail, all but 90
days of which were suspended. Id.





trooper released her and she returned to her car.9 She claimed that
Jones then sped off down the highway without headlights, where-
upon she and her passenger, now driving, raced down 1-95 in pur-
suit of the police cruiser.' ° After the woman and her friend realized
they would be unable to reach Jones, they called the police."
At trial, Byrd, a state police officer, was permitted to testify over
objections that he overheard a conversation on CB radio channel 19
a short time before the victim's complaint was broadcast over the
police radio. The conversation described a small car chasing a light-
less "Smokey Bear."'"
On appeal to the Court of Special Appeals, Jones claimed that
the trial court erred in admitting this evidence under the present
sense impression exception to the hearsay rule. The intermediate
court agreed,' 3 stressing that Byrd was unable to corroborate,
through his own present sense impressions, the event the declarants
described." Not only was Byrd not on the scene himself, but he was
merely an eavesdropper rather than a participant in the conversa-
tion.' 5 To the Court of Special Appeals, these factors meant that
the evidence lacked sufficient attributes of reliability, relevance, and
trustworthiness to be admissible.' 6
The Court of Special Appeals relied on its holding in Booth v.
State' 7 to reverse the trial court's decision in Jones. In Booth, the wit-
9. Id.
10. Id. at 26, 532 A.2d at 170.
11. Id., 532 A.2d at 169-70.
12. Id. at 27, 532 A.2d at 171. Before the jury, Officer Byrd said:
On the CB radio in the state police car, Channel 19, 1 overheard a trucker on
the CB said [sic] that it was Smokey the Bear southbound in a police car with no
lights on and right after that . . . another trucker on Channel 19 advised that
there was a little car just took off [sic] behind Smokey the Bear trying to catch
him at a high rate of speed.
Id. at 28-29, 532 A.2d at 171.
At the trial level Byrd had related the conversation in direct quotes: "Look at
Smokey Bear southbound with no lights on at a high rate of speed," and the response,
"[hlook at that little car trying to catch up with him." Id. at 28, 532 A.2d at 171. The
Court of Appeals did not rule on the legal significance, if any, of the officer's change in
language--whether it represented a change in recollection or merely a different way of
saying the same thing. The court pointed out that the trial judge was not asked to rule
on the narrative version, and further stated that counsel for the defendant did not pre-
serve for review the question of the change in words. Id. at 29-30, 532 A.2d at 172.
Judge Eldridge filed a one-paragraph concurring opinion stating that he would hold that
there was no material variance in the two statements. Id. at 35, 532 A.2d at 175.
13. Jones v. State, 65 Md. App. 121, 127, 499 A.2d 511, 514 (1985).
14. Id. at 126, 499 A.2d at 513.
15. Id. at 125, 499 A.2d at 513.
16. Id. at 126, 499 A.2d at 513.
17. 62 Md. App. 26, 488 A.2d 195 (1985), aff'd, 306 Md. 313, 508 A.2d 976 (1986).
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ness testified as to a telephone conversation she had with the declar-
ant/murder victim, Ross, on the night of his murder. 8 The trial
court permitted the witness to testify that Ross told her that a girl
named Brenda was in the apartment at the time.' 9 The witness said
that she then heard, over the telephone, a female voice and the door
of the victim's apartment being opened.2" When she asked Ross
who was there, he responded that Brenda was talking to "some guy"
behind the door."'
According to the Court of Special Appeals, the evidence in
Booth was far more reliable than that sought to be admitted in Jones
because (1) the declarant was known to the witness and identifiable
to the court; (2) one of the parties to the conversation in question
was the witness, who, unlike any of the conversants in Jones, was
available for cross-examination; and most importantly, (3) the wit-
ness herself could corroborate the present sense impressions, as she
could verify that she heard a female speaking in the apartment and
someone come to the door. 2
After the Court of Special Appeals decided Jones v. State, the
Maryland Court of Appeals heard Booth.2' The court upheld the
Court of Special Appeals' affirmation of Booth's conviction, but de-
cided the case on different grounds.2 4 In the opinion that has be-
come the definitive Maryland ruling on the present sense
impression exception, the Court of Appeals held that what is re-
quired for admissibility is that the declarant be describing, without
preparation, an event that he or she is personally observing as it
occurs.2 5 The underlying rationale is that "substantial contempora-
neity of event and statement negative the likelihood of deliberate or
conscious misrepresentation. '26 The Booth court,.unlike the Court
of Special Appeals, held that the identity of the declarant need not
be known, and that a present sense impression need not be "corrob-
18. Id. at 29, 488 A.2d at 197.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Jones v. State, 65 Md. App. at 126, 499 A.2d at 513. In its Jones opinion, the
Court of Special Appeals stressed these facts in Booth, stating that they indicated the
witness could provide necessary corroboration. Id. at 126, 499 A.2d at 513.
22. Id. at 126, 499 A.2d at 513.
23. Booth v. State, 306 Md. 313, 508 A.2d 976 (1986).
24. Id. at 330-31, 508 A.2d at 984-85.
25. Id. at 331, 508 A.2d at 985. The statements in Booth, of course, met those re-
quirements. Id.




orated by an independent and equally percipient observer."'2 7 Iden-
tification and corroboration, while often helpful in measuring the
competency of statements as present sense impressions, nonethe-
less are not what determines the hearsay's reliability. 28 It is the con-
temporaneous occurrence of event and description that guards
against memory loss and other pitfalls typically associated with hear-
29say testimony.
The Court of Appeals granted certiorari in the Jones case to con-
sider it in light of the Booth decision."0 In Jones the Court of Special
Appeals had warned that "[t]o permit evidence such as that of Byrd
would throw open the door to imaginative, if not fabricated, present
sense declarations between unknowns."'" Ironically, it was the
Court of Appeals' ruling in Booth that left the door open for the pos-
sibility of admitting the evidence in Jones. The question remains, has
the door been left open too wide?
II. BACKGROUND LAW
In Booth the Maryland Court of Appeals joined a majority of
jurisdictions in adopting the present sense impression exception to
the hearsay rule in the form in which it appears in Federal Rule of
Evidence 803(1). Under the heading "Hearsay Exceptions; Availa-
bility of Declarant Immaterial," rule 803(1) provides:
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule,
even though the declarant is available as a witness:
(1) Present sense impression
A statement describing or explaining an event or con-
dition made while the declarant was perceiving the event or
condition, or immediately thereafter.32
This type of statement, even though hearsay, is considered ad-
27. Booth v. State, 306 Md. 313, 327-30, 508 A.2d 976, 983-84 (1986).
28. Id. at 330, 508 A.2d at 984.
29. For the requirements for admissible present sense impressions, seeJones, 311
Md. at 30-32, 532 A.2d at 172-73.
30. Id. at 28, 532 A.2d at 171.
31. 65 Md. App. at 126-27, 499 A.2d at 513.
32. FED. R. EvID. 803(l). In Booth the Court of Appeals observed that 28 states have
codified present sense impression exceptions to the hearsay rule, most of which are pat-
terned after rule 803(l). Booth v. State, 306 Md. 313, 321, 508 A.2d 976, 979 (1986).
See, e.g., N.C. R. EvID. 803(1); N.H. R. EvniD. 803(1); W. VA. R. EvID. 803(1).
For a case in which a declarant was held to be "explaining" a contemporaneous
event, see State v. Reid, 367 S.E.2d 672, 674-75 (N.C. 1988) (police officer's testimony
as to what a police captain told him as the latter was destroying a rape kit was admitted
as present sense impression evidence because declarant was explaining the destruction
of the evidence as it happened).
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missible because due to the statement's contemporaneity, not only
is the declarant not likely to be fabricating a story, but there also has
been insufficient time for the declarant's memory to have become
distorted."
In the nineteenth century, jurists recognized a "res gestae' 3 4 ex-
ception to the general rule that hearsay is inadmissible. 5 Res gestae
was an umbrella encompassing several types of spontaneous state-
ments: those relating to present bodily condition or present mental
states and emotions, excited utterances, and declarations of present
33. FED. R. EviD. 803(1) advisory committee's note. The advisory committee dis-
cussed the time element and permissible subject matter of these declarations in its note
to rule 803. Under the present sense impression exception, the committee recognized
that "precise contemporaneity" is not always possible and "hence a slight lapse is allow-
able." Also, the statement must be limited to "description or explanation of the event or
condition, the assumption being that spontaneity, in the absence of a. startling event,
may extend no farther." Id. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Peterkin, 511 Pa. 299, 513 A.2d
373 (1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1070 (1987). In Peterkin, the Supreme Court of Penn-
sylvania ruled that the reliability of present sense impression evidence turns on its con-
temporaneity with the event being described. Id. at 312, 513 A.2d at 379. A gas station
employee, subsequently killed during a robbery, had made several earlier statements to
third parties about the defendant. Id. The court considered admissible those state-
ments made to a witness over the telephone while the employee was observing the de-
fendant testing a gun, locking the door, and getting into a car. Id. The court said other
statements made by the employee to third parties about the defendant's possession of a
gun and the combination to the safe were not shown to be contemporaneous with the
observation and therefore were not admissible. Id. at 313, 513 A.2d at 380.
See also Stumpfv. State, 749 P.2d 880 (Alaska Ct. App. 1988);Johnson v. White, 430
Mich. 47, 420 N.W.2d 87 (1988). In Stumpf, the Alaska appellate court, citing United
States v. Peacock, 654 F.2d 339, 350 (5th Cir. Aug. 1981), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 965
(1983), found that "[r]eports about the contents of a telephone call made by the call's
recipient to a third party, immediately after the call terminates, are admissible under this
rule." 749 P.2d at 894. InJohnson, an unidentified declarant told a trial witness that the
plaintiff's decedent's car failed to stop at a stop sign. 430 Mich. at 51, 420 N.W.2d at 89.
The Supreme Court of Michigan noted that it had been no more than four minutes
between the accident and the declaration and held that the interval satisfied the present
sense impression exception's requirement, codified in MIcH. R. EvID. 803(l), that the
statement be made while the declarant was perceiving the event or "immediately after."
430 Mich. at 57, 420 N.W.2d at 91.
34. "Res gestae" literally means "things done." It is a term designed to include
words, thoughts, gestures-all spontaneous and automatic declarations so connected
with an event as to be considered a part of it. BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 1173 (5th ed.
1979). In many jurisdictions today ",es gestae" is no longer a hearsay exception per se;
rather, the various types of spontaneous utterances such as excited utterances and pres-
ent sense impressions each constitute a hearsay exception. For a good description of res
gestae, see Cassidy v. State, 74 Md. App. 1, 9-16, 536 A.2d 666, 670-73 (1988). In Cassidy
the Maryland Court of Special Appeals stated that res gestae has no use as a separate
concept-if the evidence in question fits none of the recognized hearsay exceptions such
as present sense impression, then it will not be admissible as falling under a separate
category called res gestae. Id. at 15, 536 A.2d at 673.
35. E. CLEARY, MCCORMICK'S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 288, at 835 (3d
ed. 1984).
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sense impressions.3 6 The case most often cited as the origin ofjudi-
cial use of the priesent sense impression hearsay exception is Houston
Oxygen Co. v. Davis,s which, interestingly enough, stressed the need
for corroboration by the witness of the declarant's present sense
impressions.3 8
Although the exception is recognized today in most jurisdic-
tions, cases dealing with present sense impression are relatively
sparse. Like the judges of the two Maryland appellate courts, who
recognized that Booth fell within the exception yet utilized different
criteria, judges in other jurisdictions disagree over whether the ex-
ception should be given narrow or broad interpretation and
whether specific fact patterns fall within it."9 When evidence charac-
36. Id.. Interestingly, Wigmore never recognized present sense impressions as con-
stituting an exception to the hearsay rule, believing that contemporaneity alone was not
a guarantee of trustworthiness. 6J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1757, at 238 (J. Chadbourn
rev. 1986). For a historical discussion, see Booth v. State, 306 Md. 313, 317-20, 508
A.2d 976, 977-79 (1986). See generally Waltz, The Present Sense Impression Exception to the
Rule Against Hearsay: Origins and Attributes, 66 IowA L. REV. 869 (1981) (discussion of
background, history and elements of the present sense impression exception).
For a discussion on the differences between the present sense impression and the
excited utterance exceptions, see United States v. Moore, 791 F.2d 566, 572 n.4 (7th
Cir. 1986) (admitting a statement of defendant's secretary under excited utterance ex-
ception). In Moore the Seventh Circuit stated that the excited utterance exception re-
quires that "1) a startling event or condition occurred; 2) the statement was made while
the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or condition; and
3) the statement relates to the startling event or condition." Id. at 570.
Maryland courts have recognized res gestae exceptions. See, e.g., Mouzone v. State,
294 Md. 692, 697-701, 452 A.2d 661, 664-66 (1982). The Court of Appeals in .1Iouzone
discussed res gestae exceptions and specifically recognized the excited utterance excep-
tion. The court pointed to the "importance of examining the circumstances in toto to
determine whether the statement was the result of reasoning and reflection or a sponta-
neous response to the exciting event." Id. at 698, 452 A.2d at 664. See also Neusbaum v.
State, 156 Md. 149, 163-64, 143 A. 872, 878 (1928) (distinguishing between a statement
"induced by the shock of seeing a human being run over" by a car and a statement made
as a result of a calculated, albeit quickly executed, investigation); Wright v. State, 88 Md.
705, 708, 41 A. 1060, 1061 (1898) (statement made after time for reflection not admissi-
ble under res gestae exception to hearsay rule).
37. 139 Tex. 1, 6, 161 S.W.2d 474, 476 (1942) (ruling statement was admissible as it
was "sufficiently spontaneous to save it from the suspicion of being manufactured").
38. Id. at 5, 161 S.W.2d at 476. The witness, an occupant of a car, observed another
car passing by at a high rate of speed. This witness recounted a comment made by a
second occupant of his car, who reportedly said that "they must have been drunk, that
we would find them somewhere on the road wrecked if they kept that rate of speed up."
Id. The Texas court ruled that (1) by its very nature, this statement, although unexcited,
was safe from the declarant's memory defects; (2) there was little or no time for calcu-
lated misstatements; and (3) the reporting witness had equal opportunity to observe and
verify. Id. at 6-8, 161 S.W.2d at 476-77. According to the court, these factors rendered
the statement competent and the evidence reliable. Id.
39. See infra notes 40-43.
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terized as fitting into this exception is not admitted, however, the
clear reason is because the court has made a judgment that it is un-
trustworthy. In making that judgment of unreliability, courts have
pointed to such shortcomings as lack of proven contemporaneity4 °
and lack of proof that the declarant was speaking from personal
knowledge,4' especially when the declarant is unknown 42 or the wit-
ness cannot provide corroborating testimony.43
40. In some cases the shortcoming is clear-cut, as it was in Halfacre v. State, 292 Ark.
331, 731 S.W.2d 179 (1987). In Halyacre, the Supreme Court of Arkansas ruled as inad-
missible a police officer's testimony about a description given to him by a witness to a
robbery. Id. at 334, 731 S.W.2d at 180. The hearsay description did not fall into the
present sense impression exception because it was given "some time after the robbery,
and not while [the eyewitness] was perceiving the event, or immediately thereafter." Id.
Other times, however, extrinsic evidence may show the lack of contemporaneity. In
a citizens band (CB) case involving a conviction for interstate transportation of a stolen
vehicle, a police officer was permitted to testify about a conversation he had with an
unidentified declarant on the CB who told him he had seen "two white shirtless males
walking from the place where the truck had been abandoned." United States v. Cain,
587 F.2d 678, 679 (5th Cir. 1979). Shortly after the conversation in question, other
unidentified people came on the radio and told the officer they had seen two shirtless
white males walking five to six miles east of the abandoned truck. Id. At that location,
the defendant and his companion, escaped prisoners who fit the description, were taken
into police custody. Id. They were subsequently charged not only with escape but also
with the federal stolen vehicle violation. Id. The court determined, however, that the
defendant's presence five miles away from the truck within a few moments of the CB
radio report that described him leaving the truck made it impossible that the first trans-
mission had been contemporaneous with the event. id. at 681. The court ruled that the
officer's testimony about that conversation-which linked the defendant to the stolen
truck-therefore should not have been admitted under the present sense impression
exception. Id. See also Commonwealth v. Peterkin, 511 Pa. 299, 313, 513 A.2d 373, 380
(1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1070 (1987) (without evidence about the amount of time
between the victim's observation of the gun and the combination in appellant's posses-
sion, and the victim's statement to the witness, the court was unable to conclude that the
events were sufficiently contemporaneous). For further discussion of Peterkin, see snpra
note 33.
41. In Miller v. Keating, 754 F.2d 507 (3d Cir. 1985), an unknown bystander at the
scene of an automobile accident had announced, "the bastard tried to cut in." Id. at
509. The court found that the statement, standing alone, lacked trustworthiness. Id. at
512. The court pointed out that there was no way to know whether the declarant had
personally observed the car cutting in. Id. at 511. Rather, the bystander could have
been making a conclusion based on what he saw after the accident took place, or he even
could have been a participant who was covering for his own actions. Id. at 511-12. His
unavailability for questioning compounded the problem. The court concluded that
there was no way to infer that the unknown declarant spoke from personal knowledge.
Id. at 511.
42. See M'Iiller, 754 F.2d at 51 1; Cain, 587 F.2d at 679.
43. The New York Appellate Division upheld a requirement for corroboration of
present sense impression declarations by the testifying witness in People v. Watson, 100
A.D.2d 452, 466, 474 N.Y.S.2d 978, 987 (1984). At issue was a telephone conversation
between the witness and the murder victim, id. at 457-59, 474 N.Y.S.2d at 982-93, simi-
lar to the fact situation in Booth. This witness, however, was unable to hear whether
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Courts also have addressed the issue of whether the testimony,
if admitted, would violate the sixth amendment's confrontation
clause, made applicable to the states through the fourteenth amend-
ment.4" The Supreme Court ruled in Ohio v. Roberts45 that when a
hearsay declarant is not present for cross-examination at a criminal
trial, his or her declarations are admissible if there are adequate "in-
dicia of reliability."46 The Court observed, however, that if the
statement falls within a "firmly rooted hearsay exception," reliability
for purposes of the confrontation clause may be inferred.4"
III. ANALYSIS
The Court of Appeals' interpretation of Booth was correct. An
important result of the ruling was the emergence of the flexibility
subsequently displayed in Jones. If the Court of Appeals had inter-
preted the present sense impression exception in Booth as the Court
of Special Appeals had done, there would have been no room for
discretion to allow admission of Officer Byrd's testimony in Jones. In
Booth, however, the Court of Appeals deliberately and correctly gave
this hearsay exception a broad scope in a thorough opinion that
anyone had knocked at the door or actually had entered the apartment. Id. at 459, 474
N.Y.S.2d at 983. To the New York court, this meant that the witness's testimony that the
declarant said, "the super came to check my bathtub" did not contain the "indicia of
reliability" required for the confrontation clause. Id. at 466, 474 N.Y.S.2d at 987.
44. U.S. CONST. amend. VI provides that "[in all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses against him." See also infra
notes 72 & 74.
45. 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
46. Id. at 66, 73. The Supreme Court also stated that "normally" when a hearsay
declarant is not present to testify at a criminal trial, the confrontation clause "requires a
showing that he is unavailable." Id. at 66. The Court did note, however, that such a
"demonstration of unavailability" is "not always required." Id. at 65 n.7. See infra note
72 and accompanying text.
47. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66. The Supreme Court did not define "firmly rooted." One
commentator believes that the present sense impression exception should not be so
considered. Goldman, Not So "Firmvly Rooted'" Exceptions to the Confrontation Clause, 66
N.C.L. REV. 1, 27-32 (1987). Goldman wrote that the rationale linking contemporaneity
and reliability is based on "questionable psychological assumptions." Id. at 28-29.
Those include, according to Goldman, any assumption that "descriptive accuracy is a
natural consequence of observation and that this accurate observation is preserved by a
contemporaneous statement." Id. (footnote omitted). Goldman concluded that the only
way to reconcile these exceptions with reliability requirements of the confrontation
clause is to discard notions of "firmly rooted" exceptions and have courts examine all
such evidence on a case-by-case basis to ensure that under the particular circumstances
there are guarantees of trustworthiness. Id. at 47. It is apparent that courts do examine
particular circumstances involving present sense impression evidence to determine
trustworthiness. The Maryland Court of Appeals' analysis injones is only one example.
See infra notes 74-77 and accompanying text.
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The Court of Appeals' conclusion in Booth that corroboration is
not absolutely required was well reasoned. The advisory committee
to the Federal Rules of Evidence nowhere discusses a necessity for
corroboration.49 Moreover, most cases on point stress that it is
trustworthiness that must be shown.50 When courts point to the exist-
ence of corroboration, it is because the corroboration strengthens a
finding of trustworthiness.5 '
The Court of Special Appeals in Jones, in discussing what makes
48. See, e.g., People v. Luke, 136 Misc. 2d 733, 737, 519 N.Y.S.2d 316, 319 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1987). At issue in Luke were declarations made over the telephone to the 911 opera-
tor while a burglary was in progress. id. at 734, 519 N.Y.S.2d at 317. The New York
Supreme Court in Luke considered whether the declarations were reliable present sense
impressions absent corroboration, and cited Booth as an example of a state high court
holding that corroboration was not required. Id. at 736-38, 519 N.Y.S.2d at 318-19.
The Luke court also had to consider the issue in light of the New York Appellate
Division's holding in People v. Watson, 100 A.D.2d 452, 466, 474 N.Y.S.2d 978, 987
(1984), that corroboration was required. For a discussion of Watson, see supra note 43.
The Luke court found the Watson limitation inapplicable because the surrounding cir-
cumstances in Luke, unlike those in Watson, were such that the present sense impression
had "a great deal of reliability." 136 Misc. 2d at 739, 519 N.Y.S.2d at 320. Among
additional circumstances indicating reliability to the court was the fact that the declar-
ant's identity was known to the prosecution. Id. In addition, police officers arriving at
the crime location within minutes observed a scene that indicated the declarant's state-
ments were accurate. Id.
49. The Maryland Court of Appeals, in Booth, observed that "the drafters of the Fed-
eral Rules knew how to word a requirement of corroboration, and did not do so" with
this exception. Booth v. State, 306 Md. 313, 327, 508 A.2d 976, 983 (1986).
50. See cases cited infra note 51.
51. In State v. Case, 100 N.M. 714, 676 P.2d 241 (1984), the court excluded testi-
mony because it found "questionable" the statement reportedly made by the declarant,
whose whereabouts were unknown at the time of the trial. Id. at 718, 676 P.2d at 245.
The witness would have testified that the declarant announced, "there goes [the murder
victim]" several days after the murder allegedly occurred. Id. at 717, 676 P.2d at 244.
The witness herself saw nothing. Id. After ascertaining that the identification was based
on a brief glimpse of a person thought to be the victim, the court concluded that exclu-
sion of the statement, the nature of which was "questionable," was not error. Id. at 717-
18, 676 P.2d at 244-45.
See also State v. Flesher, 286 N.W.2d 215, 218 (Iowa 1979); Commonwealth v. Cole-
man, 458 Pa. 112, 120, 326 A.2d 387, 390-91 (1974). In Flesher the Supreme Court of
Iowa adopted the present sense impression exception for the state and also ruled that
corroboration was not required. 286 N.W.2d at 218. At issue in Flesher was a telephone
conversation the witness had with his wife, the murder victim. Id. at 216. The lower
appellate court had pointed out that when telephone conversations are involved, "in-
dependent verification of the facts giving rise to the declarant's impression may be im-
possible," but nevertheless found the testimony sufficiently reliable. Id. at 220. The
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present sense impression declarations admissible, incorrectly ap-
plied McCormick's Handbook on the Law of Evidence's (McCormick) analy-
sis of the reliability of such evidence. McCormick believes that three
safeguards exist with statements that fall within this exception to the
hearsay rule: (1) contemporaneous observations ensure against er-
rors based on the declarant's faulty memory, (2) there is no time for
deliberate fabrication, and (3) the declarant usually speaks to a third
person also present at the scene, who later becomes the trial wit-
ness. The third person also observed the event and therefore can
provide corroboration."2 The Jones Court of Special Appeals inter-
preted these as requirements for the present sense impression ex-
ception, observed that Byrd personally could not corroborate the
witnesses' observations, and concluded that "[pilainly, the testi-
mony of Byrd does not satisfy McCormick's third factor . Mc-
Cormick, however, actually distinguishes between a rationale for
allowing admission and a requirement that must be fulfilled before
guidance may be admitted." When corroboration does exist, courts
point to it because it may provide "an added assurance of accu-
racy,"" justifying the admission. That most witnesses are able to
provide this corroboration, however, is not sufficient reason to make
it required, according to McCormick.56
McCormick even characterizes the position taken by some courts
that corroboration is required as "a radical departure from the gen-
eral pattern of exceptions to the hearsay rule." 7 McCormick con-
cluded, "The matter had better be left for consideration as an aspect
of weight and sufficiency of the evidence rather than becoming an
added needlessly complicating requirement for admissibility. 58
Iowa Supreme Court affirmed, noting that corroboration, or the lack thereof, should
only affect the weight afforded the declaration. Id. at 218.
In Coleman the facts were similar. At issue was the admissibility of testimony by the
victim's mother about a telephone conversation the witness had had with the victim just
prior to the murder. 458 Pa. at 114, 326 A.2d at 388. The Pennsylvania court pointed
to the existence of some corroboration for the witness's testimony: the witness, speak-
ing to her daughter over the telephone, could hear shouting in the background, and the
defendant himself admitted that he and the victim were arguing loudly at the time. Id. at
119, 326 A.2d at 390. Nevertheless, the court stressed that verification is not a prerequi-
site of admissibility under the present sense impression exception. Id.
52. E. CLEARY, supra note 35, § 298, at 860.
53. 65 Md. App. at 125, 499 A.2d at 513.
54. E. CLEARY, supra note 35, § 298, at 862-63.
55. Id. at 863.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 862.
58. E. CLEARY, supra note 35, § 298, at 863.
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B. Reliability
The Court of Appeals in Jones separated the question of trust-
worthiness of present sense impression evidence from the issue of
the credibility assigned evidence by the factfinder.59 While some
courts, including Maryland's Court of Special Appeals, Would con-
sider corroboration to relate directly to trustworthiness and there-
fore would exclude unsupported declarations, the Court of Appeals
prefers that corroboration or lack of it be a factor for juries to con-
sider in weighing the evidence. 60 What is essential, according to the
court, is that the statements be demonstrably contemporaneous
with the event in question and that it be evident that the declarant
was speaking from personal knowledge. 6'
Moreover, in Booth the Court of Appeals held that although
identification of the declarants may be helpful in establishing that it
was a competent present sense impression, identification is not re-
quired, as the statement itself may demonstrate the percipiency of
the observer. 2 InJones the court found that the CB statements were
'self-evidently contemporaneous,' "6 thereby obviating the need
for identification as well as satisfying the timing requirement.64
In addition, the Court of Appeals inJones dismissed the defend-
59. 311 Md. at 32, 532 A.2d at 173.
60. Id.
61. Id. These characteristics result in the "inherent trustworthiness" the Court of
Appeals ascribes to present sense impression statements. Id. See also United States v.
Medico, 557 F.2d 309 (2d Cir. 1977). In Medico an eyewitness to a bank robbery gave
the license number of the getaway car to a bank customer, who gave it to the witness
bank employee, who wrote it down. Id. at 313. Even though the first two people in-
volved were unavailable, the court deemed the evidence reliable because the timing in-
volved was so close to contemporaneous that the likelihood of inaccuracy was very small.
Id. at 315-16.
62. Booth v. State, 306 Md. 313, 325, 508 A.2d 976, 981-82 (1986). See also State v.
Smith, 285 So. 2d 240 (La. 1973). In Smith an unknown woman handed the robbery
victim a slip of paper with defendant's license number written on it. Id. at 242. The
court found the paper admissible hearsay under either the present sense impression or
the excited utterance exceptions. The court found the declaration reliable even though
the identity of the eyewitness was unknown. Id. at 244.
63. 311 Md. at 30, 532 A.2d at 172 (quoting respondent's counsel at oral argument).
For a contrasting declaration, see United States v. Cain, 587 F.2d 678 (5th Cir. 1979),
discussed supra note 40.
64. 311 Md. at 30-31, 532 A.2d at 172-73. Jones also claimed that the statement that
the car was "trying to catch up with" the police cruiser was an opinion, and therefore
inadmissible. Id. at 32-33, 532 A.2d at 173. The court disagreed, saying that
"[a]lthough couched in terms of an opinion, the statement in the context of this case is
the quintessence of a shorthand statement of fact, describing in few words a number of
facts about the proximity, apposition, and movement of two motor vehicles." Id. at 33,
532 A.2d at 174. The court concluded that -[t]he form in which the information was
communicated did not render it inadmissible." Id.
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ant's concern that without corroboration there is no way to test the
truth of the witness's testimony.6 5 Essentially, the court would not
recognize the existence of a credibility problem that is in substance
any different from that normally arising with any oral testimony.
Declaring that "[t]here is no absolute safeguard against lying," 6 the
court rightly concluded that any witness "who would testify that he
heard something when he did not could as well testify that he saw
something when he did not." 67
The Court of Special Appeals also had questioned the relevance
of the disputed evidence to the Jones case, pointing out that it was
not reliably ascertained that the CB conversation had in fact per-
tained to Jones, the complainant, or even to 1-95.68 As the Court of
Appeals pointed out, however, for the radio conversation to have
been in fact irrelevant, it would be necessary for one to believe that
at the time of the incident, in the general vicinity, there was another
small car chasing a different lightless state police car-a coincidence
the court understandably had difficulty imagining. 69
C. Common Sense and Discretion
The Court of Appeals believed that the Court of Special Ap-
peals' fear of encouraging wholesale fabrication between unknown
declarants was outweighed by the "inherent trustworthiness of a
statement of perception given contemporaneously with the event
being described ... ."o Jones, therefore, turned on the Court of
Appeals' perception of the trustworthiness of the present sense im-
pressions at issue. Satisfied as to threshold relevancy and finding
the evidence as reliable as any present sense impression, the court
stressed that the evidence fell within the requirements of the excep-
tion.7 Had the court felt otherwise, it retained enough discretion
under Booth to have construed the situation narrowly and ordered
the testimony's exclusion.7" Had the court believed, for example,
65. Id. at 31-32, 532 A.2d at 173.
66. Id. at 32, 532 A.2d at 173.
67. Id.
68. 65 Md. App. at 126, 499 A.2d at 513.
69. 311 Md. at 34, 532 A.2d at 174.
70. Id. at 32, 532 A.2d at 173.
71. Id. at 35, 532 A.2d at 174.
72. The court could have found that the evidence lacked the indicia of reliability to
satisfy the confrontation clauses of the state and federal constitutions. Instead, the court
found that the necessity and reliability tests of Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980), were
satisfied. 311 Md. at 34-35, 532 A.2d at 174-75.
See also Brown v. Tard, 552 F. Supp. 1341 (D.N.J. 1982). In Tard the defendant filed
a habeas corpus petition after being convicted in state court of first degree murder,
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that the facts were so bizarre as to have no credibility whatsoever,7 3
the court could have insisted upon other extrinsic evidence of relia-
bility that would show, for instance, that the statements were con-
temporaneous or that they were in fact a result of the declarants'
personal perceptions.74 Alternatively, the court could have ruled
that the evidence's probative value was outweighed by the possibil-
ity of unfair prejudice. 75 The court's conclusion in Jones is a victory
for practicality and common sense over judicial obscuration, and it
reflects the court's deference to the truth-finding process.
claiming his constitutional right of confrontation had been denied. Id. at 1344. The
district court held admissible testimony of a man regarding a telephone conversation
with the declarant/murder victim in which she said the defendant was in her apartment
fixing the air conditioner. The court held that the evidence fit into New Jersey's present
sense impression exception and thus was reliable for confrontation clause purposes. Id.
at 1351.
See also Commonwealth v. Howard, 375 Pa. Super. 43, 50-51, 543 A.2d 1169, 1173
(1988) (court rejected defendant's argument that right to confrontation was denied,
stating that the evidence fell under present sense impression exception to hearsay rule).
73. See State v. Case, 100 N.M. 714, 676 P.2d 241 (1984). For a discussion of Case,
see supra note 51.
74. Booth v. State, 306 Md. 313, 330, 508 A.2d 976, 984 (1986). See also Williams v.
Melton, 733 F.2d 1492 (11 th Cir. 1984). In Williams the appeals court reversed the dis-
trict court's granting of a writ of habeas corpus. Id. at 1493. Several bystanders to an
automobile accident heard an unknown declarant say that the driver of the other car,
who disappeared from the scene, looked like the defendant. Id. at 1493-94. The appeals
court ruled that the declaration fit into Georgia's general res gestae rule and was admissi-
ble. The court further ruled that for purposes of the confrontation clause, requirements
additional to those of the res gestae exception may be imposed to ensure reliability. .1d. at
1495. The court found that there existed circumstantial evidence at the scene that sup-
ported the declarant's identification of the defendant. The court also stressed that this
was a discretionary decision to be made on a case-by-case basis. Id. at 1496.
75. FED. R. EVID. 403. Due to a general recognition that fact patterns and other
more subtle characteristics will differ from case to case, the trial judge has this discretion
with nearly every evidence admissibility decision. If the judge feels that admitting other-
wise highly relevant evidence will cause unfair prejudice by confusing the jury or sug-
gesting an improper reason for the jury's decision, the judge's decision to exclude it
rarely will be reversed on appeal unless the appellate court finds that the judge has
abused his or her discretion in not having adequate reasons for the exclusion. E.
CLEARY, supra note 35, § 185, at 546-48. See Cross v. State, 282 Md. 468, 476, 386 A.2d
757, 762 (1978) (trial judge should have excluded evidence of a collateral criminal act
because its probative value as evidence of a "common scheme" was substantially out-
weighed by unfair prejudice to the defense). See also Hunt v. State, 312 Md. 494, 540
A.2d 1125 (1988), in which a tape of a murdered police officer's remarks broadcast over
the police radio was admitted under the present sense impression exception pursuant to
Booth. Id. at 504 n.4, 540 A.2d at 1129 n.4. The Hunt court also discussed the trial
judge's discretion in such matters and, citing Cross, ruled that the tape was neither un-
usually sensational nor unfairly prejudicial and therefore it was properly admitted. Id. at
504, 540 A.2d at 1130.
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IV. CONCLUSION
The Court of Special Appeals, in its Booth opinion, precluded
the admissibility of evidence such as the CB conversation in Jones.
That the Court of Appeals did not preclude the evidence indicates
its philosophy that the adversary system possesses sufficient safe-
guards to allow a present sense impression exception to be utilized
in a liberal manner. In the name of preventing possible abuse in
bizarre situations, the Court of Special Appeals" strict construction
in Booth and Jones generally would have prevented juries from hear-
ing highly probative evidence that possesses sufficient safeguards
for reliability. InJones the Court of Appeals preferred to leave it to
trial advocacy, emphasizing not only that the jury was free to weigh
the evidence and decide for itself the credibility, but also that the
defendant's counsel likewise was free to cross-examine the witness
and argue for the unreliability of the statements.
7 6
Given the rarity of present sense impression cases, the Court of
Appeals is correct to leave the Maryland' exception broad enough
that common sense is not thwarted in the interest of preventing the
possible onslaught of fabrication. Other evidence admissibility
questions are nearly always discretionary; the Maryland rule does
not present any difficulties that cannot be resolved on a case-by-case
basis.77 The door is open, but it can be closed whenever it is truly
necessary.
JUDITH LYNN SCHLOSSBERG
76. 311 Md. at 32, 532 A.2d at 173.
77. In every case the trial judge has the power to exercise discretion in making deci-
sions on the admissibility of evidence. This often involves what McCormick refers to as a
"cost benefit calculus." E. CLEARY, supra note 35, § 185, at 546-48. In admissibility
questions involving present sense impressions, the judge makes a preliminary factual
determination that includes ensuring that declarants were speaking from contemporane-
otis, personal knowledge of the event they described. The court thus ensures the legal
competency of the evidence. The judge makes a preliminary judgment as to probative
value as well, and has the option to exclude evidence when the judge believes the "bene-
fits" are outweighed by the "costs," or "probable dangers" inherent in the evidence. Id.
§ 185, at 546-47. See also supra note 75.
See Park, A Subject Matter Approach to Hearsay Reform, 86 MicH. L. REV. 51 (1987), in
which the author argues for liberalization of the hearsay rules with respect to civil trials
because sources of evidence in civil trials generally are more reliable. Id. at 94. Park
acknowledged the danger of drawing stark general contrasts with criminal trials but
stated, "[n]evertheless, it is fair to note the absence, or at least greatly diminished role,
of declarants who are informers, accomplices, or prisoners." id. at 99.
550 [VOL. 48:537
